There is a notable lack of scientific consensus on whether electric and magnetic fields (EMF) constitute a health risk in need of systematic control. Even those who see EMF as a public problem, share few assumptions about the type of problem it represents, whether serious risks to health are involved, or about the collective action it warrants. In the absence of conclusive scientific evidence, the interpretations of various social and political institutions have moved into the foreground, each bringing a different perspective to the issue and a unique way of accommodating the ambiguity surrounding the question of health effects. The result is a confusing mixture of warnings and reassurances, of calls for more study, or for immediate action, that distinguishes the EMF issue from other, better-defined environmental risks. While much of the discussion of EMF has focused on the synthesis and assessment of experimental and epidemiologic research on health effects, this paper explores the diversity of institutional interpretations to shed some light on the social and political responses to the issue and how these might shape its future in public policy. The paper concentrates on the selected norms and practices of three institutions, centrally involved yet differing in their interpretations: the scientific community, the legal system, and public bureaucracy. The disparities that form among the interpretations of institutions faced with ambiguous evidence and ill-formed problem definitions can lead to tensions and a search for alternative means of resolving contested meanings.
and electric appliances may pose a risk to health has become widely recognized as a legitimate and worrisome hypothesis in need of thorough investigation. The first round of epidemiological studies focused attention on a hypothesized relationship between both residential and occupational EMF exposures and leukemia (Wertheimer and Leeper 1979; Wiklund et al. 1981) . Subsequent efforts to replicate these studies have not settled the question of EMF'S role in cancer, nor have laboratory results at either the cellular or animal level identified a definitive biological mechanism to support such a role (Pool 1990 ). In light of this scientific uncertainty, some have dismissed the results to date as implausible (Huber 1989) . Others have claimed a conspiracy to suppress conclusive, positive findings (Brodeur 1989c ) and have offered accounts of personal tragedy from EMF exposures through expos& in national magazines, such as the New Yorker (Brodeur 1989a (Brodeur , 1989b and Family Circle (Brodeur 1990 ). The response of most scientists and public officials has favored further investigation. In recent years, Congress has held several hearings (see, e.g., Electric and Magnetic Field Research and Public Information Act of 1990); the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA 1989) . the Department of Energy (Bonneville Power Administration 1989) . and the Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA 1990a) have issued reports; and a number of states have convened expert panels to investigate the possibility of adverse health effects from EMF (e.g.. California 1989; Oregon 1990) . Despite all of this attention, the evidence accumulated so far appears inadequate to support an authoritative claim one way or the other (see Morgan and Nair 1990) .
There is also a notable lack of consensus on whether EMF, as currently understood, constitutes a problem in need of a public policy response entailing something more than financial support for research. Even among those assured of its problematic status, there is no unifying presumption about the type of problem it represents or the collective action it warrants. In the absence of conclusive evidence, the interpretations of various social and political institutions appear to have moved to the foreground of the debate, each bringing a different perspective to the issue and a distinctive way of accommodating the uncertainty over adverse health effects. The result is a somewhat confusing mixture of warnings and reassurances, of calls for more study, or for immediate action, that distinguishes the EMF issue from other, better-defined environmental risks (Banks 1989a) . As evidence accumulates, it may continue to be filtered through the distinctive lenses of different institutions, setting the conditions for a contest over meaning (Edelman 1988) . whose eventual outcome may well influ-ence both public understanding and the course of public policy on EMF. While much of the discussion of EMF has focused on the synthesis and assessment of experimental and epidemiologic research on health effects, this paper is intended to explore a small segment of the diversity of institutional interpretations to shed some light on the evolving social and political responses to the issue.
Qpically, patterns of diversity in accommodating risk and uncertainty are linked to individual rather than institutional responses (Douglas 1988) . Diversity in responses by individuals to environmental risks can be attributed to well-documented biases and heuristics that shape perceptions of risk and judgments about its acceptability (Fischhoff et al. 1981 ). In the case of EMF, however, there is no benchmark for defining exposure, and thus, no way to adequately perform a risk assessment on which individuals and their biases might then operate. Without a coherent risk estimate, or reliable calibration of any kind, questions of acceptability become secondary to questions of meaning and interpretation. The focus, then, shifts from individual cognition to the cultural norms and values that form an interpretative frame for attaching meaning to the ambiguous and the uncertain (Douglas 1970) .
Since, as Douglas notes, these interpretive frames are encoded in social and political institutions, studying institutions comparatively should offer insight into a major source of differences over how the EMF issue is being defined and assessed. In turn, the EMF issue can be seen as typifying a class of politically contentious issues in the gray region between law and science. Hence, the reader might also view EMF as representing a policy arena that offers a better vantage point for understanding institutional capabilities and agendas.
Institutions perform a wide array of interpretive functions; they "simplify the potential confusions of action by providing action alternatives; they simplify the potential confusions of meaning by creating a structure for interpreting history and anticipating the future; and they simplify the complications of heterogeneity by shaping the preferences of participants" (March and Olsen 1989: 171-2) . Unfortunately, an analysis of how these broad institutional functions affect both expert and lay understanding of EMF risk is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I concentrate on the selected norms and practices of three institutions, centrally involved in the EMF issue and yet offering diverse interpretations: the scientific community, the legal system, and public bureaucracy. 1 give examples of how the ambiguous evidence and ill-formed problem definitions that lead to this diversity of interpretation create disparities and tensions across these institutions. From this analysis, I argue that resolving these differences and building consensus within our prevailing political order should ultimately engage the public as a legitimate means of deliberating over contested meanings and interpretations. The paper concludes with suggestions for facilitating such public engagement.
To date, the legislatures or administrative agencies of some seventeen states have explicitly considered the possible health effects of EMF; their policy responses range from the legislature's dismissal of health concerns for lack of sufficient evidence, as in Wyoming, to the codification of formal EMF limits for transmission lines, by regulatory authorities, as in Florida (Banks 1989b ). If recent litigation over condemnation and torts where EMF health risk has been posed as an issue is included-several examples of which will be discussed below-then the number increases to twenty-five states. Unlike other policy areas, such as fiscal management, wherein the innovative approaches of a few states diffuse to the rest and create relatively uniform patterns, there has been no particular pattern of leadership or imitation among the states on EMF policy. The lack of unanimity among the states may well reflect the uncertainty among experts regarding the health risks from EMF. Such diversity is also consistent with the fact that the same institution does not have exclusive jurisdiction over EMF issues in every state. Administrative agencies are active in some states, courts in others, a mix of institutions, or none, in still others. To the extent that institutions take on a distinctive bias, as a product of their constitutive norms and practices, we might expect the public policy responses of state governments to the EMF issue to reflect the biases of the institutions assuming de facto jurisdiction over this issue.
In the next section, I propose a simple conceptual schema for exploring institutional diversity and introduce the concept of "institutionalized bias" as a means of summarizing the distinctive patterns of norms and practices that characterize the three institutions under consideration. Following a discussion of each institution, along with examples of how each has framed the EMF issue, I focus on the contrasting meanings assigned by two of these institutions-the scientific community and the legal system-to several terms that are central to the interpretation of evidence on EMF risk. In the closing section, I consider a measure to alter the "balance" among the contending biases by providing a procedural avenue for public discussion and interpretation of the EMF issue.
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A Schema for Viewing Diversity:
The Inrtltutlonallzed Bias
In the face of uncertainty over a given hazard, institutions can choose either to act or to postpone action, depending upon their norms for weighing information and for judging the possible outcomes of each choice, as well as upon the procedural practices they follow in reaching their decision. Some of their norms may have been imposed by other institutions or by the larger society, as with the civil court's norm that the plaintiff bear the burden of persuasion, while other norms may be a product of institutional learning, for example, the habits of skepticism within the scientific community. Similarly, procedural practices may have been tailored to implement certain norms-witness informal rule making within public bureaucracy-or may have evolved over time as the norms were tested in practice. In any event, when confronted with imperfect or conflicting information, the norms and practices of each institution implicitly make a presumption in favor of one choice or another: act now on the imperfect information, or wait until the need for action becomes more clearly defined. For purposes of this discussion, this inclination to act or to wait represents an "institutionalized bias" toward a particular choice under uncertain circumstances and prospects. In this context, waiting does not preclude action later, nor does it rule out a decision to ultimately do nothing. Nonetheless, as in the case of action, waiting may prove to be a costly mistake, depending on subsequent events.
Although mistakes are to be expected, not all mistakes carry the same consequences. Borrowing a simple distinction from decision theory, the choice of action versus inaction involves an implicit tradeoff between two kinds of errors: the false positive-acting when no action was warranted; and the false negative-failing to act when action was warranted (Page 1978; Linder and McBride 1984) . At the time a choice is made, the warrant is prospective and depends principally on the institution's assessment of the likelihood and costs of each kind of error. This assessment, in turn, is based on norms that reflect the institution's values. If one kind of error is viewed as more likely or more objectionable, the norm to avoid errors of that kind can function as an inducement to scrutinize evidence in a certain way or to view uncertainty with a standing expectation (Gaines 1990) . Consistent with our focus on two kinds of errors, there are two patterns of norms that emerge, one representing a bias toward acting and the other, a bias in favor of waiting. The two patterns are presented in Table 1 . The column heads of Table 1 identify the two institutionalized biasesto act or to wait. The first norm, the Inducement, is intended to capture the institution's aversion to the possible outcomes of false positive and false negative errors. The second norm, the Evidenriary Srundurd, links the inducement to a particular standard for weighing evidence. A bias toward action, in the first column, is consistent with a low threshold for evidence sufficient to warrant action; conversely, a bias to wait entails a high threshold and stringent requirements before evidence warrants action. The third norm, the View of Risk, posits a standing interpretation of risk claims that reinforces the bias to act or to wait. Here, the aversion to false negatives and low threshold for evidence warranting action is linked to suspicions that risk may be substantial and that, when in doubt, harm should be presumed. In contrast, the bias to wait reserves judgment about the nature of the risk and can question safety without imputing harm.
The fourth row in Table 1 shifts attention from norms to institutional practices. For the three institutions discussed here, the principal prac-tice is the procedural mechanism each relies upon for reaching decisions. While a particular choice may well contravene one's institutionalized bias, the procedures can be expected to support, or at least not disrupt, the underlying pattern of norms. Public bureaucracy, for example, employs a variety of mechanisms, ranging from negotiation over standards and commitments to formal and informal rule making; however, all are not equally supportive of the norms that predispose the institution to act rather than to wait. This complication is discussed in a later section. The procedural mechanism posited for the scientific community's deliberations is peer criticism. Adjudication premised upon adversarial proceedings is the mechanism assigned to the legal system. While the scientific community and the legal system are described as sharing similar norms, and hence the same institutionalized bias, the differences in their procedural mechanisms support separate forms of discourse (Overington 1977; White 1984) . These separate forms are of interest here principally because they involve different meanings being assigned to some of the terms used to define risk. The consequent disparities in the interpretations offered by these two institutions are discussed below.
Finally, the last two rows of Table 1 depict the outcomes if EMF is ultimately found to be either harmful or harmless. This construction assumes that errors and correct responses can be treated as discrete, well-defined outcomes and that the benefits and costs of those outcomes primarily affect an institution's relationship with the wider society. The discreteness of outcomes is perhaps the most demanding assumption. But it simplifies the presentation considerably and permits us to concentrate on only two, polar types of institutionalized bias rather than on a continuum of more realistic, mixed forms that occupy the gray area between error and correctness. The next section examines the institutionalized bias of three institutions: the scientific community, public bureaucracy, and the legal system. Following a brief overview of each institution's bias are some examples of responses to the EMF issue. The section closes with an account of the operation of procedural differences and their implications for the interpretation of evidence on EMF health effects.
The Institutions The Scientific Community
The scientific community as an institution has a high stake in avoiding false positives-public claims of an association later found to have been unjustified, for example-since its authority in public policy matters is linked both to its public image of skepticism and to the perceived conservatism of its procedural mechanism for validating evidence (Large and Michie 1981) . When this image is shaken because of premature claims of danger that mislead the public or its officials, the credibility of science as a whole suffers. The procedural mechanism within the scientific community for validating research claims is built on skepticism; it subjects each claim to critical, often anonymous, scrutiny by a collection of peers. The institutionalized bias toward postponing action effectively insulates this iterative process of criticism and revision from outside time pressures. Moreover, in assessing health effects, evidence from diverse fields within the community is expected to converge or to present a similar pattern of effect before passing the high threshold set for defining causality. In the case of EMF, this would likely require agreement, for example, between physicists and biologists over the mechanism of biological effect (TDHSNb 1991: 3).
Avoiding false positives may well be a concomitant of the central role played by peer criticism and replication in establishing scientific legitimacy. If one were to assess the outcomes listed in Table 1 , one could not easily declare one kind of error more serious than the other, in the absence of any direct political accountability or electoral links to the public. On the one hand, timely claims about risks in need of public action are a potent source of social support for scientific research; on the other hand, the public relies on science to protect it from the premature and ill-founded claims of others on society's resources. The scientific community's aversion to false positives can easily test public patience with the pace of scientific progress on any issue, including EMF, and confuse calls for more careful study with veiled attempts at strategic delay. Critics of postponing action until further research is completed assign self-serving motives not only to the stakeholders, such as the electric power industry, but also to the scientists who will conduct the studies. And yet, the consequences of false negative errors have been substantial. The scientific assurances given to the public throughout the decade of the 1950s that nuclear testing and radiation exposure posed no grave danger created a credibility problem, in the view of some analysts, with which the proponents of nuclear power must still contend (Bupp and Derian 1978) .
Ironically, for the individual scientist, the false negative may represent the more serious risk; a pattern of claims establishes one's reputation and status, even if some proportion of the claims are eventually refuted by the larger process of testing and replication. Several other institutions can effectively exploit this irony by invoking the authority of science while inviting investigators to preempt the scientific process by making their intramural claims public. The print and electronic media have procedural devices for validating evidence to avoid false positives, although they are by design less time-and resource-intensive and therefore less stringent than those of science (Nelkin 1987) . The false negative, in contrast, can represent a threat to their economic well-being. The media coverage given to EMF has been prompted in part by the general climate of public concern about concealed threats to health. It can also be seen, however, as an effort by news directors and managing editors to minimize the risk of missing a potentially significant phenomenon, given their perception of a shift on the part of some scientists now intent on doing the same. Being a part of a possible "scoop" may have sufficient appeal, for some in science as well as the media, to outweigh the risks of sounding a false alarm.
An Example from the ScientiJic Community. A number of public panels of scientists have reported to state governments on the research literature and possible risks from EMF. Rather than sample the findings of these panels, I will use a recent episode involving the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its Scientific Advisory Board to illustrate briefly the workings of the institutionalized bias attributed to the scientific community.
Late in 1990, EPA's Office of Health and Environmental Assessment (U.S. EPA 1990b) released an external draft report, Evaluation of the Potential Carcinogenicity of Electromagnetic Fiehk, which was surrounded by controversy over both its conclusions and its internal review (Lynch 1991a: 4) . The executive summary of the report noted that several residential and occupational studies of exposure "show a consistent pattern of response which suggests a causal link [between EMF and cancer]" (U.S. EPA 1990b: 1-7). The White House science advisor requested a delay in the release of this document in light of disagreements among reviewers from several other agencies over the weight assigned to the evidence and this conclusion (TDHSN 1991a) . When the report was released in October, it included a note to reviewers that there was insufficient evidence for a causal link between EMF and cancer. Six months earlier, basically the same document had been circulated as a workshop draft and accompanied by leaked information that the original EPA assessment classifying EMF as a "B 1 ," or "probable" human carcinogen had been withdrawn following White House review (Lynch 1991a: 4) . EPA's cancer guidelines contain a matrix that compares evidence from long-term animal tests and human (epidemiological) studies, ordered by five categories of relative weight, ranging from "no evidence" to "sufficient" evidence. Group B 1, the second-highest overall weighting, includes agents for which there is "limited" but not "sufficient" evidence of carcinogenicity from epidemiological studies; no animal evidence is necessary for such a designation. A subcommittee of EPA's Scientific Advisory Board disagreed with this assessment and found that the evidence cited in either version of the report could not support the suggestion of a causal link. Two public hearings were convened by the Scientific Advisory Board's Subcommittee on Nonionizing Electric and Magnetic Fields to receive testimony on the balance and thoroughness of the report. At the second of these hearings, the purpose of the report as well as the subcommittee's charge were disputed (Lynch 1991b: 10) . Was the report intended to be an informational document that would identify priorities for future research or an effort to characterize exposure and evaluate hazards as a prelude to regulatory consideration? The institutionalized bias that is mapped out in Table 1 suggests that the latter intent is more consistent with EPA's rulemaking function and its weighting of the evidence presented in the report. EPA's testimony did not clarify matters.
EPA's initial request for input from the Scientific Advisory Board was largely targeted to the appropriateness of the cancer classification and to whether there was enough evidence cited in the report to support an EMF/cancer link (Lynch 1991b: 10) . While the subcommittee ultimately responded to this request, its parent committee, the Radiation Advisory Committee (RAC), raised more fundamental questions about the validity and overall scientific merit of the report. Accordingly, RAC wanted the subcommittee (1) to contrast the report's interpretation with "what science says on those issues," reassessing how well the evidence cited fit the standards of science, and (2) to draw their own conclusions, emphasizing clearly what remains unknown (Lynch 1991b: 9) . Implicit in this request is the reassertion of the scientific community's institutionalized bias in favor of skepticism and the avoidance of false positives. In effect, the subcommittee was drawn between the competing biases shown in Table 1 and ended up supporting the scientific bias against the regulatory one, but without challenging the purposes or legitimacy of the report. The last recommendation of the subcommittee's epidemiology subgroup (Heath 1991: 2) captures the flavor of the overall review:
Throughout the Draft [Report] , special care should be given to avoid gratuitous speculation or surmise which may favor either negative or positive interpretations of data beyond the actual limits of those data. The conservative intent of the Draft can only benefit by evenhanded caution and careful precision in its wording.
Public Bureaucracy
Administrative agencies charged with regulatory responsibilities generally address scientific uncertainty through procedural mechanisms patterned after either the legislature or the courts. The formality of the agency's deliberations, its gathering and use of evidence, and its connection to judicial oversight will typically follow one of these two institutional designs. Agencies are likely to find the pattern of norms defining their institutionalized bias set down, along with their procedural mechanism, in their authorizing legislation (Gelpe and Tarlock 1974) . Agencies charged with regulatory responsibilities over functional policy areas-environmental quality, energy, or health, for instance-may be delegated authority to protect public health and safety and permitted to exercise considerable discretion in situations where evidence is only suggestive of harm (Rodgers 1980) .
These agencies tend to follow quasi-legislative procedures for rule making, involving a notice and comment process and informal hearings or consultations on any rules, orders, or decisions to be adopted as part of the state's administrative code. The setting of mandatory standards at both the federal and state level tends to conform to this pattern of informal rule making, in part, as a way of capitalizing on agency expertise. In Texas, for example, agency decisions based on informal rule making are considered under the same presumptions of legitimacy as legislative ones. The agency need only present a reasoned justification backed by more than a "scintilla of evidence" to meet legal challenges to its decisions. Such deference to agency discretion permits a large measure of predictive judgment to color the agency's treatment of uncertainty, especially in situations where scientific evidence appears inconclusive, Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act (APTRA) 1989.
In contrast, agencies charged with assigning property rights, duties, or privileges or with granting permission of some sort tend to adhere to quasi-judicial procedunx involving evidentiary hearings based in testimony under oath, depositions and writs of subpoena, the compilation of a formal record, and case-by-case deliberation. Regulatory decisions on rate making and licensing and certification of various types tend to follow this more formalized procedure across the states and at the federal level (Breyer 1982) . The quasi-judicial procedures that frame regulatory responsibilities for the taking or giving away of something of value have far more extensive "due process" protections for the af€ected parties than does informal rule making. The agency's discretion, however, is more narrowly defined and its judgment given less opportunity to influence the final outcome than in informal rule making (McGarity 1979) . In Texas, for example, this more formalized regulatory process falls under the rubric of "contested cases" (AFTRA 1989, art. 6252-13a). Not only are regulators bound by strict procedural requirements, but their decisions are subject to much closer scrutiny by the courts than for informal rule making. Once a decision is challenged, no deference is paid to the agency's deliberations or conclusions. The agency's decision must be replicated by the court, otherwise, it will be modified or overturned.
Examplesfrom Public Bureaucracy. If a public agency is authorized to address problems of public health or safety in terms of control strategies and to promulgate mandatory standards through informal rule making, we can expect to find incentives to avoid false negatives and evidentiary norms that support an institutionalized bias in favor of action. In the case of EMF, we can expect mandatory standards in the form of exposure limits or maximum permissible field levels to emerge as the favored response once the agency decides to exercise its judgment.
Departments of energy or environmental affairs, for example, appear more likely to rely on codified limits that define a threshold of unacceptable exposure for fields either at the edge of, or in the middle of, the utility's right-of-way (OTA 1989) . To the extent that the legal authority for regulatory agencies with a risk management mission is framed in terms of the setting of uniform standards, they have an inherent bias toward avoiding "false negatives" since the setting of standards that are binding across individual circumstance is more likely to err on the side of overinclusiveness (Breyer and Stewart 1979) . The enabling statutes for standard-setting agencies will typically mandate precautionary action in the face of uncertainty; the justification in these instances may be based principally on a presumption in favor of protective measures when public health and safety are at issue (Rodgers 1987) . Not surprisingly, the few states that have formal field limits-Montana, Oregon, and Floridaare also those that vest authority over transmission line certification or operation in such agencies or their offspring.
In contrast, public utility commissions tend to rely on formalized rule making and quasi-judicial procedures. These procedures effectively move these agencies away from the institutionalized bias of the regulatory agency and toward the avoidance of false positives shared by science and the courts. Rules are more likely to be stated as guidance for claimants before the agency than as mandatory limits on behavior and to be applied on a case-by-case rather than universal basis (Phillips 1986; Sponseller 1987) . Guidelines for mitigating exposures, as in a recent case before the Colorado Public Utilities Commission, tend to focus on a particular location and on actions by a specific party rather than on general mitigation requirements (Colorado 1989) . Here, as in the civil courts, the norms behind the procedural mechanism and its treatment of evidence favors existing levels and forms of precaution already in place over prospective ones whose warrants have not yet been established (Lehr 1990) .
As scientific findings strengthen the warrant for action, the first step is likely to be either a clearer articulation of guidance regarding the treatment of EMF in the certification process, as in North Dakota and Colorado, or an effort to establish the pattern of current exposures, say, from overhead transmission lines, as a benchmark for assessing the need for any subsequent precautions, as in New York State. The effect of these two approaches is not to prohibit field strengths above a certain threshold, say, by making them illegal as in the case of codified field limits, but rather to expand the burden of persuasion incumbent on the proponents of new high voltage lines or upgrades to incorporate EMF considerations in their applications (Watson and Warnquist 1991) .
Logically, we would expect the public utility commissions of any two states, for example, to be more similar to each other in how they deal with scientific uncertainty than to a health or environmental agency within their state. Under this interpretation, it clearly matters which kind of institution has assumed de fact0 jurisdiction over the EMF issue, since different institutions will employ different norms and procedures to assist in its interpretation.
The Legal System
Criminal courts, perhaps out of social consensus rather than judicial temperament, share the same aversion to false positives that motivates the scientific process; accordingly, their threshold for action is set quite high, demanding a close scrutiny of plausible evidence of guilt, their warrant for action. However, like scientists they also align incentives in a way that expresses, ironically, substantial concern for false negatives. The institutionalized bias of civil courts depends in large part on the kind of remedy sought by the claimants, who bear more of the costs of error in deference to the status quo (Huber 1988) . Increasingly, the courts are open to claimants willing to take on the burden of proving that EMF is potentially harmful either to their property values or their health. These claims attract media attention and may serve as a barometer of public concern; but they also signify a willingness on the part of the legal system to patiently reassess the state of scientific evidence before changing the status quo.
The courts effectively reverse the logic of the public utility commissions, although the bias toward avoiding false positives-perhaps principally through an aversion to change in the status quo-and case-by-case consideration remains the same. In this forum, the burden of persuasion falls not on the proponents of new lines or upgrades but on their opponents, who attempt to prove that EMF considerations entitle them to compensation or relief of some sort. Here the court rules first on the admissibility of such claims and then upon whether the evidence behind these claims provides sufficient grounds for a judgment in favor of or against them. Unlike the public utility commissions, the courts will rarely pass judgment on the substance of any EMF effects. Several cases can serve as prototypical examples.
Emmplesfrom the Legal System. By and large, most condemnation cases -claiming property for public conveyance-have ruled out any consideration of EMF health risks, since the statutory language authorizing "takings" is typically very explicit about what may and may not be admitted as grounds for compensation. Until this language is changed by the legislature, the courts are not very likely to expand the scope of conflict to incorporate these new elements-with four notable exceptions, the Klein, San Diego, Miller, and Zappavigna cases (Houston Lighting & Power v. Klein Independent School District; San Diego Gas & Electric v. Daley; Miller v. State of New York; Zappavigna v. State of New York). All of these cases involve the efforts of different courts to address public concern over the health effects of EMF. None of the findings deals directly with whether EMF is the cause-in-fact of adverse health effects. Rather, they deal with people's apprehensions about such effects and, in two of the four cases, with whether there are any reasonable grounds for this apprehensiveness.
In Klein, the jury, in effect, found that apprehension over EMF risks dictated caution and faulted the utility for not taking these concerns senously. In San Diego the jury compensated a property owner for losses due to the apprehensiveness of buyers over potential health risks, given the proximity of his land to transmission lines. The Miller case in New York State dealt with the same issue but added the burdens of proving
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that such apprehension had depressed land values in the past and that a p prehensiveness itself had a reasonable basis. In all three cases, backing for the claims of specific health effects mattered far less than the doubts these claims raised about public safety-doubts that were kindled by the ambiguity and inconclusiveness of the scientific evidence. In the end, the court's judgment hinged on the credibility of the expert testimony and on whether the apprehensiveness born of this testimony could or should have affected the particular behaviors-utility siting or valuation-for which a legal remedy was sought.
Since the OTA report (OTA 1989: 73) cited the Kkin case as one of the "growing pressures for states to take regulatory action to protect citizens against possible risks," it is useful to take a closer look at it. The Klein Independent School District filed objections with a county trial court to Houston Lighting and Power Company's condemnation of an easement across the school district's property for the siting of a 345kV transmission line. Unlike most other condemnation cases where the amount of "just compensation" is at issue, in this case the school district alleged that the utility had abused its discretion in taking the easement and had subsequently erected the transmission line in "reckless disregard" for the school's use of the property. The trial court granted judgment against the utility, voiding the condemnation and awarding punitive damages for trespass. The state court of appeals overturned the award of punitive damages and claims of trespass but found a credible basis for the jury's finding that the utility had abused its discretion in taking the district's property.
The findings in the Klein case did not address the claim "that there are potential health effects associated with exposure to powerline fields," as the OTA report (OTA 1989: 73) alleges. While Klein may afFect the level of caution with which utilities address health concerns in future siting applications before the public utility commission, its major import is procedural rather than substantive. The court of appeals' acknowledgment that, based on the expert testimony presented, the Klein jury could have believed that the utility exercised poor judgment appears somewhat removed from the OTA report's suggestion that Kkin constitutes a call for regulatory action to protect citizens. Similarly, the OTA report cited the "Cancerphobia" case (2izppavignu v. State ofNew York) as another dramatic incident of pressure for public regulation of field exposures. This was a class action suit by a group of land owners asking compensation for losses due to the apprehensiveness of buyers at the proximity of their land to a 345kV transmission line; the key issue was which one of two opposite holdings-the Sun Diego case, where damages were awarded, or the Miller case, where they were denied-would be adopted. The judge found the Miller precedent the more compelling of the two and rejected the land owners' claims of buyer apprehension for lack of sufficient evidence. This case, if anything, undermines the warrant for regulation, assuming-as the OTA report seems to-that public concern is often a prime catalyst for regulatory action, since the court found that buyer concern alone, in the absence of scientific Confirmation, was not sufficient grounds for the court to intervene.
Despite the parallel between legal and scientific norms, the best scientists do not necessarily have the most to contribute as experts to the adversarial process, and vice versa, from the litigator's perspective, since the necessity of adopting legal conventions when addressing scientific matters requires more the skills of a translator than those of a scientific investigator. Furthermore, taking sides in an adversarial proceeding may require the kind of categorical statement that crosses the boundary from what can be scientifically supported to what can be argued, quickly escalating from scientific claims to metascientific ones (Men. 1990) . Statements by scientific experts in the K k i n case, for example, clearly abandoned scientific conventions in favor of legal or regulatory ones. On one side, they held that claimants "would probably experience an increased risk" or "a significantly increased risk" and that such risk was "unnecessary" or "indefensible"; on the other, they claimed that there were "no significant biological effects." Contesting scientific findings in an adversarial arena that admits only two sides of the issue appears antithetical to the notions of doubt and skepticism that are prominent features of the procedural mechanism within science.
The next section selects the languages of two institutions-science and the courts-that play a prominent role in framing the public features of the EMF issue but, at the same time, represent extremes of contrasting interpretation. While a substantial literature addresses the fate of scientific evidence in the courts (O'Brien 1987; Huber 1988; Smith and Wynne 1989), the discussion here emphasizes differences in the meaning assigned by each institutional language to a small selection of contested terms in the EMF debate, effectively providing an alternative footing for their disparate interpretations.
The Disparate Languages of the klentific

Community and the Courts
Both science and the courts employ a complex procedural logic to justify decisions based on uncertain evidence. Both rely on elaborate rules of evi-dence to structure the drawing of inferences, and both erect high procedural thresholds for proof to avoid false positives. And while both embrace advocacy directed to one's peers, science tests these claims through an iterative process of consensus formation, law through an adversarial one.
Despite their functional similarities, however, several basic differences create a gap between them when it comes to the handling of uncertainty.
Meanings Assigned to "Significance"
A prominent obstacle to the appropriate use and interpretation of scientific evidence by the law and policy-making institutions is the disparity in meaning between ordinary and technical usages of the same terms. The term significance is notorious in this regard. Part of the problem can be attributed to science's attachment to a frequency interprebtion of probability, wherein chance is defined in terms of repeated outcomes. Policymakers, in contrast, tend to employ a subjective notion of chance that ties uncertainty, not to random processes, but to credibility and degree of belief (Jervis 1979; Aberbach et al. 1981) . In policy terms, a significant result becomes synonymous with a credible or believable result; in this sense, the authority of the source and the persuasiveness of the argument framing the results can overwhelm quantitative depictions (Majone 1989) . A credibility interpretation of chance and uncertainty has traditionally informed legal judgments about the probity of evidence, and varying standards of legal proof are often phrased in these terms (Apple et al. 1986) .
A "preponderance of the evidence," the standard of proof in civil proceedings, for example, implies a greater-than-50-percent certainty regarding the truth of the plaintiff's claims. Legal writings have also tied "beyond a reasonable doubt," the standard for proof of guilt in criminal trials, to being at least 95 percent certain of the truth of the prosecution's charges before guilt can be established (Large and Michie 1981) . By coincidence, a 95 percent standard is also invoked in scientific treatments of evidence but with a very different interpretation. As will be discussed below, the 95 percent level in science is not so much a truth standard for judging claims as it is a criterion upon which to base predictive judgments. The former asks, "How certain are you about this claim?" while the latter asks, "What percentage of the time do you expect the evidence supporting it to recur?" Note that both admit there is a chance of being wrong. For the law, however, being wrong may represent a cognitive failing or a deception, but may also serve some social ends. For science, being wrong is strictly controlled by a hypothetical model of future prospects (Latin 1982) .
Confusion between the two notions of significance plagued Judge Poulton in Rausch v. The School Board of Palm Beach County when he interpreted the significance levels of the epidemiological evidence on EMF health effects as a calibration of the chances of harm, noting that "[even] a 1 percent chance that there is substantial danger is unacceptable" (quoted in Banks 1989b). In this instance, significance levels appeared to operate as a weight or discount factor in assessing the severity of the imputed danger. Surprisingly, the scientific community is not immune to confusion over the use of significance as the science intrudes on the policy realm.
The Bonneville Power Administration EMF report, a model exposition in many respects, appears to make the same mistake as Judge Poulton when it concludes from a review of community cancer studies that, "statistically, this finding was of marginal significance, however" (Bonneville Power Administration 1989: 43); here, significance again operates as a weight for assessing the relative strength of postulated effects. As a final example, consider the confusion created by confounding the two notions, as when an expert witness in Houston Lighting and Power Company v. Klein tndependenr School Dkrrict inferred from statistically significant cellular effects, a "significantly increased risk." Contrary to these uses, statistical significance has no bearing on either the "chances of harm" or the strength of any postulated cause and effect relationship.
The only valid interpretation of statistical significance is as the outcome of a test designed to answer only one question: "Is the observed result due to chance as we have modeled it, or not?" If the chance model employed cannot account for a given result, then that result is deemed "statistically significant" and likely the product of something other than chance. This designation has nothing whatsoever to do with the magnitude or importance of the result and cannot be used to calibrate its credibility; it is an all-or-nothing determination that admits no measure of degree. Further, the appropriateness of the chance model and its link to how the data were generated must be stipulated in advance and then taken for granted in testing for significance. If the data were not sampled in ways consistent with the model of chance used to define statistical significance, then tests for significance performed on these data could easily be inappropriate.
Meanings Assigned to Cause and Confidence
As we shall see below, much of the causal analysis underlying judicial proceedings involves a search for the precipitating event, known as the cause-in-foct. Evidence about this cause is weighed relative to its credibility and to the probity of those testifying in its behalf. Proof of the event then is synonymous with belief in the evidence; the stronger the belief, the higher the standard of proof that can be met. Evidence supporting a claim about cause-in-fact beyond a reasonable doubt is evidence about which one can be (approximately) 95 percent certain; in other words, there is a 95 percent chance that the alleged cause-in-fact was responsible for the event in question (see Brennan and Carter 1985) . Scientific treatment of causal inference is very different.
Causal inferences in science are based on a summary measure quantifying the relationship between an alleged cause and the event of interest. The measure itself typically appears within a range of values intended to reflect the limitations of the chance model and the amount of information available for calculating such a summary. Doubt applies not to the correctness of the measure itself, but to whether it represents the best summary available from a collection of possible summaries. Further, statements about the measure are framed in terms of confidence levels that express, not strength of belief, but thresholds of permissible doubt. A confidence level of 95 percent indicates that a given range for a summary measure, bounded by the highest and lowest values that the summary might assume, has effectively been drawn at random from a large collection of alternative ranges and will contain the "true" or best summary measure in ninety-five out of one hundred instances. This is not the same as saying that one is 95 percent certain that a particular range of summary measures contains the best one. Not only will the ranges of summary measures change from sample to sample but there is no way statistically to define the chance that the one best summary measure will lie within a given range-either it does or it doesn't.
The adversarial process used by the courts is not well suited to handling the inconclusiveness of chance models, such as random sampling, especially when it comes to establishing the probity of expert testimony about cause-in-fact. The expert's estimates of a relationship, say, a relative risk together with its highest and lowest plausible values, are translated by the rules of evidence into little more than a best guess (Latin 1982) . Some qualification in terms of the expert's relative certainty about it are typically sought, but any chance variability is confined to the observer and not to what was observed. A confidence interval then is likely to convey the investigator's confidence that the "true" estimate falls within the reported range; a 95 percent confidence level in these terms meets the highest standard of proof that the legal system imposes. Unfortunately, the conventional statistical formulation admits no assessment of confidence in the sense of degree of belief or relative certainty and confines chance variability, not to the investigator or to the relationship being investigated, but exclusively to the sampling procedure.
The statement, "My research shows that the 'true' relative risk could be as great as the value x but is highly unlikely to be less than the value y," followed by "There is only a one in twenty chance that I could be wrong" is a policy claim and not a statistical one. Both senses of "confidence" are combined into a meaningless composite. Statistically, it is the confidence interval itself-the range from the largest value x to the smallest value y-that is the random component subject to chance variability and error.
If a large number of intervals are computed independently on separate occasions, each with the same confidence level, say, .95, then in the long run of several hundred or so mes 95 percent of these intervals will cover the "true" value. The chance process in this instance is both immutable and impersonal and has absolutely no bearing on whether the investigator should be trusted or has been proven wrong in the past. Hunches about how certain he or she is, or about how likely it is that the "true" risk actually appears within the interval they have computed, simply cross over the bounds of acceptable scientific inference and are, for the most part, untenable. Ironically, these are exactly the kinds of judgments that have the greatest legal import.
While the scientific community assigns uncertainty to its causal inferences rather than to the judgment of its investigators, the legal system does the opposite. The legal system conceives of cause largely in mechanistic terms and attempts to narrow explanations to the single antecedent event or condition that can best clarify an assignment of responsibility; it admits no degrees of causality or uncertainty in this regard and draws fine distinctions as a matter of policy about the extent of a given party's involvement. Uncertainty about cause arises principally from doubt about the credibility of witnesses, including scientific experts, and the plausibility of their sometimes conflicting statements.
Legal cause can be established without benefit of scientific conclusiveness. When the scientific community can be conclusive on matters of cause, it may still not be decisive legally since courts invariably look to other sources as well for their evidence. To hold up litigation as a mirror of public concern and then to call on science for the definitive appeasement of this concern-as some EMF literature suggests (OTA 1989; Johnson 1990 ; Morgan and Nair 1990)-is to misapprehend this basic point. Conversely, to depend on the courts to resolve the ambiguities in the scientific evidence assumes a compatibility of language and logic that would permit one to take up and finish the work of the other. In place of this smooth continuity to social consensus, we are more likely to witness a reconstruction of meaning from one institution to the other that magnifies the differences in their respective interpretations.
Conclusion: A Role for the Public
The concept of institutionalized bias, with its associated norms and procedures, has been used to epitomize the ways that several institutions have responded to evidence and opinion on EMF health effects. The scientific community and the courts share similar norms that favor the avoidance of false positive errors and a bias in favor of postponing remedial action in the absence of compelling evidence. In contrast, regulatory agencies and, to a lesser extent, state utility commissions, are more inclined to avoid false negative errors and to act preemptively, based on the prospect of harm. The procedural mechanisms of the institutions that fall in one or the other of these two categories of institutionalized bias vary, however, and these differences can mgger conflicts over the meaning and significance of evidence.
With that said, one might be tempted to conclude that the policy side of the EMF issue largely boils down to a matter of de fact0 jurisdiction, since the expected policy response appears to depend principally on which institution assumes responsibility for responding. From a reformist perspective, then, choosing the right institution might at least circumscribe, if not condition, the kind of response deemed most appropriate. Under conditions of ambiguity, however, jurisdiction can be neither exclusive nor static. Multiple institutions will continue to advance simultaneous claims of jurisdiction and to contest the meanings imposed by one another, without being able to reach any conclusive resolution. Each of the institutionalized biases described above represents an attempt to impose some structure on this situation, to resolve some measure of this ambiguity by means of norms and procedures. Once stated, however, the alternative biases offered by different institutions merely shift the ambiguity from one place to another. We may claim to know which institution will best respond in a certain desired way, but we have no firm basis outside of these institutions for deciding what that way should be. Picking institutions merely begs the question of resolving which interpretation of risk is best.
The best way to address the problem of how to agree on an appropriate interpretation may rest not on the arbitrary choice of one institution over another or on ad hoc prioritizing by technical experts but on the development of a public process for discussion and deliberation that can help bring about convergence on a collective interpretation and public definition. In place of a confrontation among advocates, there might be a forum for deliberation open to possibilities for learning and accommodation among advocates and uncommitted alike. Although some problem definitions can be viewed more favorably than others and some remedies rejected as ill conceived, as long as the proper interpretation of EMF risk remains ambiguous, these matters will be contested and thus can benefit from public discussion as well as expert advice. This approach admits that much about our public response to risk is socially constructed and mediated by the same norms and values that animate our institutions. And yet, no institutionalized bias need dominate the process. Instead of imposing an interpretation on evidence and a definition on the EMF issue, institutions might act to facilitate the public's deliberation over these matters, effectively providing a critical challenge to those biases already attending institutional involvement in the EMF issue.
To foster such discussion, an institution must have sufficient expertise to be capable of brokering the relevant science and yet able to balance the counsel of technical experts with public values and concerns. Until the scientific community can offer a conclusive answer to the question of health effects-if such an answer is possible-the EMF debate will continue to revolve around questions of interpretation. By providing an arena within which viewpoints may be exchanged in a fair and open way, an institution may do much to stem the corrosive effects of ambiguity, even if only on an interim basis.
If we assume further that the interpretations of both science and the courts will continue to play as large a role in framing the eventual resolution as they have in structuring the problem, then whatever institution provides the arena must also be well equipped to accommodate the interplay of legal and scientific reasoning. While the courts have traditionally managed this interplay, the adversarial conditions accompanying the "case and controversy" requirements for judicial process can be divisive when applied to larger issues of public concern, appearing to pit law against science or science against itself (O'Brien 1987) . The courts can help to shape a social consensus on the acceptability of risk (Men. 1990 ). Yet, given the pervasiveness of exposures to EMF, less costly arenas for building a broader public consensus seem worth pursuing, especially if such an arena can encourage deliberations that are not exclusively the preserve of legal or scientific experts. A public forum, for example, would have the advantage of engaging the public directly over the issue of risk acceptability while at the same time providing a venue for airing both scientific inconclusiveness and countervailing institutional biases (Stanley 1990) .
If the principal criterion for institutional roles in developing such a public arena were institutionalized bias, a public utility commission would appear well suited. Most public utility commissions are quasi-judicial agencies accustomed to maintaining fairness in open proceedings, cooperative relations with the major public utilities, and expertise in addressing the legal and economic implications of policy issues. Judgmental bias aside, however, most of their deliberations with the public are framed in adversarial terms (Sponseller 1987) . And while a commission is well positioned to monitor the progress of EMF-related activities in other states and provide a clearinghouse for technical information about EMF, in many states it must limit its focus to transmission lines. Advocates for defining the EMF problem as a public health emergency, moreover, might find the public utility commission's relations with utilities and its emphasis on economic implications to be inhibiting and exclusionary. Others who define the problem in terms of public concern, might take exception to the absence of any mandate or experience on the part of a commission for getting information to the public or for handling field investigations of public complaints. Finally, those viewing scientific inconclusiveness as the key EMF problem might find the commission's lack of scientific expertise in health research to be limiting.
Having an additional institution collaborate with a public utility commission might serve as a counterweight to these weaknesses. State departments of health, for example, have scientific and investigatory expertise in a wide range of health matters; more importantly, they have varied experience in conducting on-site community meetings to address local health concerns and the capacity, at least, for educating and informing the public (Institute of Medicine 1989). Given the balance of strengths and weaknesses between the two institutions, departments of health might best pursue cooperative arrangements with public utility commissions for initiating and supporting community-based discussions and deliberations over the EMF issue. The difficulty for these two institutions will lie in facilitating such a forum without predetermining its outcome: in finding the motivation in institutional bias to build public consensus without imposing this bias as a definitive and authoritative view.
